chapter one
Title. LUCY LETBY IS INNOCENT.
Subtitle:- A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF “THE BRITISH DREYFUS CASE”.
CHAPTER ONE. THE LUCY LETBY TRIAL IN A NUTSHELL.
“Circumstantial evidence” is an anagram of “Can ruin a selected victim”.
“Whatever denials the accused made were taken only as a proof of Satan’s deviousness”. (The Salem Witch Trials.)
Lucy Letby was a whistle-blower, constantly complaining about conditions and omissions which put the infants on the unit at risk. The NHS has an extremely bad record of persecution of whistle-blowers, as you will see in Chapter 2, The consultants on the unit wanted her off the unit for this reason. They did not like to be criticised. (There was “a break-down of communication between senior doctors and nursing staff on the unit”, and a “toxic atmosphere of bullying in the hospital”.) Lucy was also a feminist fiercely fighting against a toxic male chauvinist environment in the hospital. The consultants made numerous attempts to remove her. Finally, they accused her of harming the infants on the unit, and made these accusations to the police. The police accepted the word of doctors, and commenced an investigation.
This investigation cost several million pounds, and the police were now committed to procuring a conviction, on the “sunk cost” principle, even if the evidence had to be “massaged” a little. In Chapter 4, I provide a list of similar cases where the police have deliberately (or by accidental omission – NO! I DON’T THINK SO!) lied or hidden exculpatory evidence, in order to secure a conviction.
The Crown Prosecution Service perhaps by “accidental” omission HID FROM THE JURY a considerable amount of EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE! If the Crown Prosecution Service had properly observed the rules of disclosure and revealed all the exculpatory evidence, they could never have secured a conviction. In Chapter 4, I provide details of similar cases where The Crown Prosecution Service has, by “accidental” omission, hidden exculpatory evidence from the jury.
I will now provide a “whistle-stop” tour of the important topics of this trial. I will enlarge on these topics in the various chapters of this book.
(1). The most important fact that was HIDDEN FROM THE JURY was the actual number of infant deaths in the unit. The prosecution purported that there were SEVEN infant deaths on the unit (in the relevant time frame). They claimed that Lucy Letby was present AT ALL SEVEN DEATHS! This looks slightly incriminating. However, the fact that the jury did NOT hear about was that there were SEVENTEEN DEATHS NOT JUST SEVEN. This hardly looks incriminating at all. There were seventeen deaths, and Lucy Letby was present AT ONLY SEVEN OF THESE DEATHS. (Various other nurses were also present at least seven deaths.) Now it just looks like the “law of averages”. The prosecution could never have secured a conviction had they not (deliberately?) hidden this vitally important piece of information. Furthermore, these other TEN deaths (ie:- seventeen minus seven) represent an extremely improbable statistical anomaly which CANNOT be explained by Lucy Letby’s presence. Clearly there was some OTHER factor in operation that caused these deaths. In that case, the seven deaths attributed to Lucy Letby are probably also the result of this OTHER factor. (For further details, see Chapter 20, item 1, and Appendix. Notes to Chapter 20, items 18, 20, 21, 28, 34, and 36.)
(2). There was a “spike” in deaths on the unit. This very precisely coincided with an alteration of the “grade” of the unit, so that they would accept far more “risky” and vulnerable infants than previously. By a strange coincidence, when (following the spike in deaths) the unit was “down-graded” back to its previous “risk level”, this was also the time when Lucy Letby finally stopped working on the unit, which coincided with a reduction in the death rate. Her presence on the unit during the “spike” in deaths is incriminatory. The coincidental “upgrading” and “downgrading” of the unit is exculpatory. The jury never heard about this “upgrading” and “downgrading” of the unit. (For further details, see Chapter 20, item 3, and Appendix. Notes to Chapter 20, items 13, 17, 19, and 30.)
(3). There were a number of “incidents” on the unit. These “incidents were either deaths or “collapses”. These “incidents” had to be classified into two categories – either “suspicious” or NOT “suspicious”. This classification SHOULD have been based ON THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE ALONE. However, in the event, the classification was based on the following criteria:- IF Lucy Letby was present, the event was classified as being “suspicious”. If she was NOT present, the event was classified as NOT “suspicious”. A professional statistician has commented – “This is a completely circular argument.” One baby died from asphyxia – suggesting smothering – but Lucy Letby was NOT present, so this death was classified as NOT “suspicious”.
This is statistical “sleight of hand”! The jury was never informed about this strange method of “classification” of incidents. If they had been properly informed, they would never have returned guilty verdicts. (For further details, see Chapter 20, item 6, and Appendix. Notes to Chapter 20, items 5, 6, 8, 16, 24, 37, and 42.)
(4). The “spike” in deaths on the unit was NOT statistically significant. However, even if it were, an unusual number of deaths will be observed somewhere among the patients of one of the millions of medical professionals in the world; It is unlikely that a 1-in-a-million coincidence will happen to any particular medical professional, but given the very large number of medical professionals in the world, it is likely, perhaps even inevitable, that such a coincidence will affect the patients of some medical professional somewhere in the world. (My highlighting.) (See Appendix – Notes to Chapter 20, item 2.)
Considering only this specific unit, the odds against this spike in deaths occurring by chance may seem like long odds. However, if you consider ALL the (say 200) (neonatal) units in the country, the spike is not especially improbable. Now if you factor in very vulnerable babies entering a unit that is not equipped to deal with such a level of vulnerability, then such a spike in deaths is not improbable at all. (See Appendix – Notes to Chapter 20, items 6 and 12.)
(5). Confounding Variables. The increase in death rate cannot, in itself, prove that the nurse in question was engaging in misconduct, because other factors, known as confounding variables, might offer alternative explanations. For example, The Lucia de Berk case (in which she was initially convicted):- The rapid increase in deaths on her ward coincided with (the confounding variable of) a decision to transfer babies with genetic birth defects to the ward. (See Appendix – Notes to Chapter 20, item 3 for further discussion of confounding variables.)
(6). The prosecution presented the deaths of various babies as unnatural without addressing the extreme vulnerability of these infants. (See Chapter 7, and also Appendix – Notes to Chapter 20, item 9.)
(7). A nearby hospital suffered a similar spike in deaths. (See Appendix – Notes to Chapter 20, item 39.)
(8). There were three spikes in collapses and deaths on the unit. June 2015 and January 2016 and June 2016. Lucy Letby was not associated with the babies in the January spike. (See Appendix – Notes to Chapter 20, item 40.)
(9). There were some alleged attacks on babies by Lucy Letby when she was, in fact, on another unit at the time. (See Appendix – Notes to Chapter 20, items 15, 21 and 41.)
(10). THE LUCIA DE BERK CASE. There is another case very similar to The Lucy Letby case. This is the Lucia de Berk case. There are some interesting and illuminating parallels between the two cases. The two cases involved exactly the same egregious error of statistical reasoning, and this error was clearly and definitively demonstrated in the de Berk case, so that she was set free, after six years in prison. Lucia de Berk was accused of killing various patients. Just as in The Lucy Letby case, the prosecution classified deaths on the ward as “suspicious” or NOT “suspicious” entirely depending on Lucia’s presence. (See Appendix – Notes to Chapter 20, item 42.)
(11). There was absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Lucy Letby (or anyone else) had harmed any of the babies. There were post-mortems carried out on most of the dead babies, and all were pronounced to be “natural” deaths. However, the chief prosecution witness, Dr Dewi Evans, put forward a series of HYPOTHESES and SPECULATIONS to explain various deaths and collapses. These hypotheses have been described by professional medical doctors as “FANCIFUL”, and “LUDICROUS”, and having “VERY LITTLE SCIENTIFIC BASIS”. The problem is that Dr Evans presented these HYPOTHESES and SPECULATIONS in the courtroom as if they were established fact, thereby bamboozling the jury, and “blinding them with science”. A judge in a previous trial had criticised Dr Evans, stating that the medical report that he had submitted was “worthless”, and that Evans had expressed “a BIASED opinion outside his professional competence”.
Dr Evans has worked for the last thirty years as an “expert” witness in court cases. He has a vested interest in “keeping in” with the police, so as to procure further “business” in the future. In that case, he has a vested interest in securing a conviction. If he had been absolutely honest and admitted that (for any particular infant) the cause of death was very difficult to establish, and could have been for any number of possible reasons – then the prosecution would have failed to secure a conviction, and Dr Evans would have no longer been in the prosecution’s “good books”. This could mean that future business from the police might not be forthcoming. This (in my opinion) explains why he put forward these “fanciful” and “ludicrous” hypotheses (masquerading as objective fact) in order to bamboozle the jury. Dr Evans has stated that he has “won” all but one of his many cases, as an expert witness. He says that the one single case that he lost “still rankles” with him. The quest for truth and justice should not be about “winning”; but for Dr Evans, “winning” is the primary objective, even if truth and justice have to “take a back seat”. (For further details regarding Doctor Evans, see Chapter 9.)
(12). The Crown Prosecution Service hired a professional statistician to come to court to give evidence of the statistical improbability of the presence of Lucy Letby at all these “suspicious” incidents. The statistician told them that it was by no means improbable, and that their statistical argument was fatally flawed. They fired the statistician BUT THE JURY NEVER HEARD ABOUT THIS. Another professional statistician described the statistical evidence against Lucy Letby as a “crock”. Another medical professional carried out calculations of the statistical data, and concluded that deaths on Lucy’s shifts “could all be down to chance”. (I will provide further details in Appendix – Notes to Chapter 20, item 23.)
(13). One of the hostile consultants supposedly “caught Lucy Letby in the act” of being present when an infant’s tracheal tube had become dislodged. He insisted that she must have deliberately dislodged it. However, according to medical opinion, tracheal tubes get dislodged all the time with neonates. The jury never heard this exonerating fact! (See Chapter 15 for details.)
(14). The persons actually present in the unit at any one time is uncertain. The “swipe-card” data was faulty, and there was another entrance to the unit, where entries and exits were not recorded. This makes it uncertain that Lucy Letby actually WAS alone with an infant at any specific time. (See Chapter 16 for details.)
(15). The Royal College of Paediatricians and Child Health inspected the unit, and gave it a “damning review” in their report. The very poor performance of the unit could well explain the spike in deaths. (See Chapter 6 for details.)
(16). Many accusations against Lucy Letby were not noted in the medical notes, but were “remembered” YEARS LATER! This suggests “selective recall”. (See Chapter 15 and also Chapter 19, item H for details.)
(17). Dr Evans accused Lucy Letby of punching one of the babies, causing liver damage. Medical experts, subsequent to her conviction, proposed other possible reasons for this liver damage. The jury never heard about these other possible reasons for the liver damage. (See Chapter 9 and Chapter 21 for details.)
(18). The unit experienced a “spike” in infant deaths and collapses. This “spike” was purported in the court to be an incredible statistical anomaly that could only occur if a serial killer was stalking the unit. However, other neonatal and maternity units around the country have ALSO experienced similar “spikes”. In that case, it was NOT an incredible statistical anomaly at all, and a stalking serial killer hypothesis was NOT required to explain it. These “spikes” were caused by sub-optimal care, which could occur for any number of reasons. The jury were never told about these other “spikes” at other locations!
(See Appendix. Notes to Chapter 20. Statistics, items 25, 39, and 40 for details.)
(19). Lucy Letby was accused of injecting insulin into some of the babies. The evidence for this was the testing of blood samples, which indicated a high level of insulin. However, the test used is unreliable. Furthermore, it was later determined by experts that the high level of insulin in the babies was actually NOT indicative of insulin being injected into the baby (for technical reasons which I will address in Chapter 14). The jury were never told about this. (See Chapter 14 for details.)
(20). The “spike” in deaths of babies in the unit coincided with a “spike” in still-births in the maternity unit of the same hospital. This suggests an outbreak of infection that affected BOTH units. The jury never got to hear about this. (See Chapter 8, and also see Appendix. Notes to Chapter 20. Statistics, item 25.)
(21). Lucy Letby took home 257 work-related documents. Only 8% related to babies that she is accused of harming. Nurses are recommended to take home medical documents, in order to answer emergency night time queries. Nevertheless, it was suggested by the prosecution that these documents were the “trophies”, of the type collected and cherished by serial killers. This suggestion is ridiculous! (For details, see Chapter 2.)
She did a lot of Facebook browsing, only a very small amount of this relating to babies that she was accused of harming. Nevertheless, the prosecution tried to impart to this social media browsing a sinister interpretation. Once again – a ridiculous smear tactic!
(22). Lucy Letby’s defence team called ONLY ONE WITNESS! The question is – WHY??? For a start, there were “reports from nursing staff - - - - of the INTIMIDATION of would-be character witnesses for Ms Letby by hospital officials.” Also, medical experts (and this is hard to believe!) actually risk their careers by going into the witness box and testifying for the defence in cases involving child abuse. In Chapter 5, I will provide evidence for this hard-to-believe fact! There is also the possibility that the defence team was warned that their careers would be better served by losing than by winning (but this is only a surmise).
(23). The hospital was about to be sued over the deaths of some of the babies. In that case, the hospital had a vested interest in finding a “scapegoat”. The civil action could not proceed while the (very long drawn out) criminal prosecution, including appeals and judicial enquiries took place. Furthermore, a serial killer on the ward would tend to exonerate the hospital management of blame. The fact is, however, the hospital management WAS to blame for accepting extremely vulnerable infants onto a seriously sub-standard unit, with inadequate staffing levels, and inadequate equipment. The consultants also had a similar vested interest in finding a “scapegoat”. They were only infrequently present in the unit, and they should have been present far more frequently than they actually were. On that basis, they were also “to blame” for the deaths and collapses in the unit. The consultants had a DOUBLE motive for finding a “scapegoat”. Apart from malice towards a “whistle-blower” (and a feminist), they desired exoneration regarding these deaths. (See Chapter 11 for further details.)
(24). The main prosecution “expert” witness, Dr Dewi Evans, accused Lucy Letby of injecting air into the veins of some of the babies, causing “air embolism”. He deduced this from a rash that some of the babies had. He obtained this information from a medical article linking air embolism with rashes. However, the writer of this original article has stated that Dr Evans had misinterpreted the article, and that the rashes that these babies in the unit displayed did NOT, in fact, indicate “air embolism”. Another medical expert described this “air embolism” hypothesis as “fanciful”. In any case, even if the babies DID have “air embolism”, this can occur quite naturally and frequently during various resuscitation procedures. (See Chapter 12 for further details.)
(25). Lucy Letby worked much longer hours than most other staff, and was therefore more likely to be present at collapses and deaths. The extra shifts, increased Lucy Letby’s “risk” of being present at a death or collapse. Also, due to staff shortages, on many occasions, Lucy Letby was the only available nurse qualified to deal with the really vulnerable infants; so she was automatically more likely to be present when collapses or deaths occurred. None of these facts were mentioned at the trial! (See Appendix. Notes to Chapter 20. Statistics, Item 7.)
(26). Frequent episodes of “apnoea” of one baby were ascribed to Lucy Letby’s attacks. However, these “apnoea” episodes continued when the baby was moved to another hospital. This did not come out at the trial. (See Appendix. Notes to Chapter 20. Statistics, Item 32)
(27). Dr Evans alleged that Lucy Letby injected air into the “drip-port” of some of the babies. He later admitted that this was “speculation, with no empirical basis” (See Chapter 9 for further details.)
(28). Dr Evans alleged in the trial that Lucy Letby injected air into the feeding tube of some of the babies. Later, after she was convicted (!), he stated that this could not have been the method used. (See Chapter 9 for further details.)
(29). One of the consultants, and also the prosecution’s chief “expert” witness stated at the trial that unexpected deaths or collapses of neonates are almost always explainable. A medical study has shown that this is incorrect, and that for some fifty percent of such deaths or collapses, there is no clear explanation. This incorrect testimony severely prejudiced the case against Lucy Letby. (For further details, see Chapter 9.)
(30). Various forensic psychiatrists and other experts have assessed Lucy Letby’s personality, and their conclusion is that she does not in any respect “fit” the profile of a serial killer. In fact, her psychological profile appears to be the exact reverse of a serial killer! (See Chapter 10 for further details.)
(31). Lucy Letby had various post-it notes in her house. Some of them contained words that COULD be construed as “confessions”. However, she had been under great psychological stress due to the investigations, and had been seeing a “counsellor”. This counsellor advised her to write down her thoughts as therapy, which she did on the post-it notes. Various forensic psychologists have viewed these post-it note “confessions”, and state that they are “meaningless”, and absolutely non-incriminatory. These post-it notes were prejudicial, and should never have been allowed into evidence. (See Chapter 17 for further details.)
(32). A transcript of the trial is unavailable to the public. The cost of a copy of the transcript is quoted at ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND POUNDS! This is part of the “cover up”. The transcript SHOULD be online, for all to see, so that the public can make up their own minds whether justice has been done, or whether a vindictive persecution has been perpetrated. However, the transcript is effectively censored, to avoid public scrutiny. (See Chapter 18 for further details.)
(33). Some people who have criticised the extreme unfairness of the trial have been vilified by members of The Crown Prosecution Service. It has been put about by The Crown Prosecution Service that to question the verdict would be “insensitive to the parents of the dead babies”, and that the careers of such critics might be in jeopardy. This is pious nonsense, put about as part of the “cover-up”. (See Chapter 18 for further details.)
(34). A highly qualified neonatologist examined the medical records of the babies that Lucy Letby is accused of harming. This expert diagnosed “major or significant sub-optimal care”, and absolutely did not subscribe to the theory of a serial killer stalking the unit. There were far more plausible medical reasons for these deaths and collapses. (See Chapter 21 for further details.)
(35). Lucy Letby was also accused of sticking a sharp object down a baby’s throat, thereby causing bleeding in the throat. However, an experienced doctor states that such throat injuries are quite common during intubation.
(36). There was pseudomonas bacteria in some of the sinks on the unit, which would be lethal to neonates. There was poor hygiene on the unit, with nurses sneezing, and not washing their hands. There was sewage backing up into the sinks on the ward, which caused a serious infection risk. (See Chapter 8 for further details.)
(37). The babies that Lucy Letby was accused of killing mostly had post-mortems, and the verdict was death by natural causes.
(38). One of the consultants accidentally killed one of the babies. He was one of the consultants who accused Lucy Letby of killing the very baby that he himself had killed! (See Chapter 21 for further details.)
(39). The chief prosecution “expert” witness, Doctor Evans wrote a report on Baby C, stating that the baby was at great risk of collapse. However, in court, he altered this opinion, and testified that air had been deliberately injected into the baby’s stomach. (See Chapter 9 for further details.)
(40). Baby O. Doctor Evans changed his allegation from liver injury to air embolism, and he changed his testimony in respect of at least two other babies – Babies P and Q. It is hard to take his evidence seriously if he keeps changing it! (For further details, see Chapter 9.)
(41). In the case of one baby, Doctor Evans stated that death was from air injected into the naso-gastric tube. When it emerged that the baby probably did not ever have a naso-gastric tube, he altered his testimony to deliberately “smothering” the baby. (My highlighting.) (See Chapter 9 for further details.)
(42). A large number of people, including doctors, statisticians, and nurses have questioned Lucy Letby’s guilt, and are lobbying for a judicial review. Clearly there is a very big question-mark over her guilt! To substantiate this statement, here is a quote from a U-Tube video:-
“I’m Pretty Sure They Got It Wrong” Academic Casts Doubt On Baby Killer Lucy Letby’s Conviction.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gIWKK8ZlqfM
“A letter protesting her innocence has been signed by 80 NHS nurses, and 70 NHS doctors.”
Here is a similar quote from another U-Tube video:-
Lucy Letby: Medical Experts Speak Out
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U4s08JzfSKk
A letter signed by 280 medical professionals was delivered to Keir Starmer in support of Lucy Letby, questioning the evidence against her, including 24 neonatal and statistical experts.
(43). The prosecution usually has more financial resources to pay for more “expert” witnesses than the defence does.
(44). In the case of baby C, the x-ray used to indicate deliberate harm to the baby was taken on the day before he died. Lucy Letby was not on the ward before this x-ray was taken, and therefore could not be held responsible for the death. (See Appendix. Notes to Chapter 20. Statistics, Item 15.)
(45). PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THE LUCY LETBY TRIAL.
The search for evidence may be distorted by biases, hidden or apparent, in the investigative process that render it misleading.
Biased data collection has been noted in criminal investigations. Miscarriages of justice are often attributed to “tunnel vision” and “confirmation bias,” processes that may lead investigators to focus on a particular conclusion and then filter all evidence in a case through the lens provided by that conclusion. There are tendencies for investigators: • to settle too quickly on a preferred theory, without adequately considering alternatives; • to look for evidence that confirms or supports the preferred theory rather than seeking evidence that might disconfirm it or support alternatives;
Psychological research suggests that people have a general tendency to gravitate toward criminality as an explanation for seemingly anomalous events, rather than looking at situational or institutional factors; this is called the “fundamental attribution error” It causes people to look to the person (ie, to human agency) rather than the situation when explaining events. Hence, people may tend to look for scapegoats to blame for bad medical outcomes arising from other causes.
Medical authorities may have an interest in the outcome of the investigation that influences what they tell the police about possible causal factors. For example, faced with an upsurge in patient deaths, hospital administrators may find it easier to imagine that it was caused by individual misconduct of a “bad apple” on the staff than to acknowledge that it may have arisen from administrative decisions related to staffing and service levels.
There is also The Primacy Effect (a greater reliance on information encountered early in a series) Since the evidence in a jury trial can be complex, and jurors often reach decisions about the verdict early on, In The Lucy Letby trial, the jury initially heard months of prosecution testimony, and had pretty made up their minds before the defense had an opportunity to make their case.
Biased recall of information:- People may remember evidence selectively to reinforce their expectations, This effect is called "selective recall", The Lucy Letby trial involves a considerable amount of “selective recall”.
Once the investigation was under way, “Groupthink” in the police force influenced its progression. Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome. Cohesiveness, or the desire for cohesiveness, in a group may produce a tendency among its members to agree at all costs.[1]
Members of a group can often feel under peer pressure to "go along with the crowd" for fear of "rocking the boat". Unwillingness to conform carries the risk of social rejection.
Once the investigation had cost several million pounds, the “sunk cost” fallacy came into play (ie:- anchoring decisions to past efforts that can’t be refunded). It was too late to then decide that Lucy Letby was innocent. They had to move forward to secure a conviction, even if the “evidence” had to be “massaged” a little. (Actually NOT “a little”.)
I will deal more comprehensively with “psychological factors in The Lucy Letby trial in Chapter 19.